What Works Best for Whom? The Effects of Welfare and Work Policies by Race and Ethnicity by Charles Michalopoulos
53
Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1, Winter 2004
Charles Michalopoulos:  MDRC, 16 East 34th Street, New York, NY, 10016. E-mail:
Charles_michalopoulos@mdrc.org.
WHAT WORKS BEST FOR WHOM?
THE EFFECTS OF WELFARE AND
WORK POLICIES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY
Charles Michalopoulos
MDRC
When the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) eliminated Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)—the ma-
jor cash assistance program for low-income families—and replaced it with a block
grant called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), it allowed states to
make substantial changes in their welfare policies. Time limits have received the
greatest attention, but most states changed their policies in other ways as well. Most
introduced financial incentives to make work pay and to increase income for families
in which the parent does work. Many have expanded their supports for the working
poor—for example, by increasing child-care subsidies. In addition, many states have
changed their welfare-to-work programs from de facto voluntary programs designed
to increase skills through basic education and training to mandatory employment-
focused programs.
This paper examines how welfare and work policies similar to those adopted by
states since 1996 have affected employment, welfare receipt, and income of white,
African-American, and Hispanic welfare recipients. The paper presents results for
single-parent families using data from studies of twenty-four welfare and work poli-
cies operated in ten states and more than a dozen counties over a period of more than
ten years. The studies were conducted primarily during the 1990s and share two
features. All of the policies were designed to increase work among welfare recipients,
and all of the studies were conducted by MDRC using a research design in which
individuals were randomly assigned either to a program group, which took part in
the new welfare and work policy, or to a control group, which did not. The twenty-
four programs cover a wide range of approaches. Some focused more on education to
help people build skills before looking for work, while some required welfare recipi-
ents to look for work. Some supplemented earnings to provide additional incentives
to work and to help ensure that families benefited financially from work. Two were
versions of TANF programs that included time limits on how long families could
receive welfare.
Although quite a bit of attention has been given to the relationship between race
and employment and race and welfare use, relatively little research has looked at
the effects of welfare policies on different racial and ethnic groups. Bitler et al. [2003]
found that welfare reform did not significantly change children’s income in African-54 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
American, white, or Hispanic families. Their approach has limited power, however,
because it identifies the effect of welfare reform policies from the short period be-
tween the first and last states’ implementation of TANF policies. Their results are
consequently consistent with both large positive and large negative effects, espe-
cially for African-American children. Ashworth et al. [2002] conducted a meta-analy-
sis of mandatory welfare-to-work programs and found that programs with more white
welfare recipients had larger effects overall on employment and welfare use than
programs with fewer white welfare recipients, but they did not examine the effects
of the same program on different racial and ethnic groups. Greenberg et al. [2003]
conducted a meta-analysis of voluntary education and training programs for the
disadvantaged and found little consistent evidence that these programs helped white
women any more or less than non-white women.
Individual evaluations using random assignment have also reported the effects
of programs by race and ethnicity. Hamilton et al [2001] looked at 11 welfare-to-
work programs that required welfare recipients to look for work or participate in
education or training and found that the programs’ effects on earnings for Hispanic
and African-American sample members were generally larger than their effects for
white sample members. Riccio et al. [1994] found little systematic difference by race
and ethnicity in the effects of the six California welfare-to-work programs they stud-
ied.
Despite the limited evidence that the effects of welfare programs have differed
by race and ethnicity, there are reasons to think that they might. Gooden [2002]
suggests that African-American and white welfare recipients have had different in-
teractions with welfare caseworkers, although she conducted interviews with a rela-
tively small group of people. Discrimination in employment and differences in edu-
cational opportunities for different racial and ethnic groups will affect how much
parents in different groups are likely to earn, but it is not clear how this would alter
the effectiveness of welfare-to-work programs. On the one hand, the lack of job op-
portunities would presumably make it difficult for welfare-to-work programs to help
minority welfare recipients. On the other hand, employment and earnings levels for
minority welfare recipients would presumably be lower than for white welfare re-
cipients, giving welfare-to-work programs a lower barrier to hurdle.
The results in this paper show little systematic variation in the effects of the
programs across racial and ethnic groups. Programs that had large effects generally
did so across the range of subgroups, while programs that had small overall effects
likewise had small effects across the groups. In contrast to the job-search-first ap-
proach used by many states’ current welfare-to-work programs, earnings and wel-
fare benefits were affected the most by the group of programs that stressed employ-
ment but allowed people who lacked basic skills to enroll in education or training
before looking for work. In addition, only programs that supplemented the earnings
of welfare recipients who went to work increased income for all major racial and
ethnic groups. However, policies that supplement earnings also typically increase
welfare use and consequently make it more likely that welfare recipients will hit
TANF time limits.55 WHAT WORKS BEST FOR WHOM?
THE PROGRAMS
This section provides some background information on the twenty-four policies.
An Appendix provides more details on the policies.
Table 1 summarizes the main work-related components of each program. As the
table indicates, nearly every program included mandatory welfare-to-work activi-
ties, and most of the programs had neither additional financial incentives nor time
limits. However, six of the programs supplemented the earnings of those who went
to work to provide additional financial incentive to work and to further increase the
income of those who worked. In addition, two programs had time limits on how long
families could receive benefits.
For much of the analysis in this paper, the twenty-four programs are placed into
one of five groups according to the primary method used to encourage welfare recipi-
ents to work.
Job-Search-First Programs
San Diego’s Saturation Work Initiative Model (SWIM) and Labor Force Attach-
ment (LFA) programs in Atlanta, Riverside, and Grand Rapids initially required
most welfare recipients to look for work.
Education-First Programs
Human Capital Development (HCD) programs in Atlanta, Riverside, and Grand
Rapids; two programs in Columbus; and programs in Detroit and Oklahoma City
initially required most welfare recipients to enroll in education and training. At-
lanta, Riverside, and Grand Rapids focused on adult basic education (ABE), while
Detroit and Oklahoma City focused more on long-term education and training.
Employment-Focused Mixed-Activity Programs
Riverside’s Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) program and the Job
Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program in Portland stressed the
importance of finding work but used a mix of initial activities, requiring more job-
ready welfare recipients to look for work but allowing others to enroll in education or
training programs. While Riverside GAIN used remedial education—ABE, prepara-
tion for a General Educational Development (GED) certificate, or English as a Sec-
ond Language (ESL) classes—Portland used both remedial education and vocational
training.
Education-Focused Mixed-Activity Programs
GAIN programs in Alameda, Butte, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Tulare Coun-
ties in California were education focused while using a mix of initial activities. Par-
ticipants in these programs who had not graduated from high school or earned a56 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
GED, who lacked basic math or verbal skills, or who did not speak English, were
assigned to ABE, GED preparation, or ESL classes. Other participants were asked to
look for work. Because these programs did not stress employment as much as the
employment-focused mixed activity programs, participants were less likely to en-
gage in job search services.
Earning Supplement Programs
Two versions of Vermont’s Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP), two versions of
the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP), Florida’s Family Transition
Program (FTP), and Connecticut’s Jobs First program all supplemented earnings of
welfare recipients who went to work by disregarding more of their earnings when
calculating welfare benefits. Sometimes earning supplements were combined with
TABLE 1
Policy Components of the Programs
Mix of job
search and
Job education as  Time-
search Education  initial  Earning limited
Evaluation or Program first first activities supplements welfare
SWIM (San Diego) 3
GAIN (California)
 Alameda  3
 Butte  3
 Los Angeles  3
 Riverside  3
 San Diego  3
 Tulare  3
NEWWS (Multi-state)
 Atlanta LFA 3
 Atlanta HCD 3
 Grand Rapids LFA 3
 Grand Rapids HCD 3
 Riverside LFA 3
 Riverside HCD 3
 Columbus Integrated 3
 Columbus Traditional 3
 Detroit 3
 Oklahoma City 3
 Portland  3
MFIP (Minnesota)
 Full Services  3  3
 Incentives Only  3
WRP (Vermont)
 Full Services  3  3
 Incentives Only  3
FTP (Florida)  3  33
Jobs First (Connecticut)  3  3 3 3 3 3 357 WHAT WORKS BEST FOR WHOM?
requirements that welfare recipients engage in job search or education and, in Florida
and Connecticut, time limits on welfare receipt.
While these programs cover many of the practices used in current welfare-to-
work programs, they were not intended to be and should not be considered represen-
tative of welfare-to-work programs in general. Many of the policies were chosen
because of their promising or innovative practices. In addition, programs were cho-
sen for other reasons that may make them unlike the “average” welfare-to-work
program. For example, programs had to have data systems capable of meeting re-
search requirements and had to have large enough caseloads to provide the sample
needed for precise results.1 Nevertheless, the effects of these programs should be
suggestive of similar programs now being run by states.
Table 2 shows the sample size and several demographic characteristics of the
sample in each program, including the percentage of sample members that were
white, African-American, and Hispanic (including Hispanic sample members of any
race). A number of programs served primarily white welfare recipients, including
Butte County’s GAIN program and Vermont’s WRP. In three sites, 70 percent or
more of the sample was African-American sample members (Atlanta, Detroit, and
Alameda). In the remaining sites, there was a fairly broad mix of white, African-
American, and Hispanic sample members, although all of the sites with a substan-
tial number of Hispanic sample members were in California, with the exception of
Connecticut’s Jobs First program.
Differences in other characteristics largely reflect the samples that were served
by the programs. The relatively small proportion of families with very young chil-
dren in GAIN and SWIM reflects the fact that the programs did not require families
with children under six years old to participate in work-preparation activities, al-
though families with younger children could volunteer. The samples for Los Angeles
GAIN and Riverside HCD are somewhat more disadvantaged than the others be-
cause Los Angeles randomly assigned only long-term welfare recipients and the Riv-
erside HCD program included only welfare recipients deemed to need basic educa-
tion services.
Follow-up information used in this paper includes earnings information taken
from reports made by employers to state unemployment insurance (UI) systems and
information on welfare payments and food stamp benefits taken from state or county
administrative records systems.2 Food stamp information was not collected for the
evaluation of SWIM. In MFIP, food stamps and General Assistance were included in
the AFDC welfare check for members of the program group. Public assistance amounts
presented in this paper for MFIP consequently include AFDC, TANF, General Assis-
tance, and the cash value of food stamps.
EFFECTS ON EARNINGS, WELFARE BENEFITS, AND INCOME
Pooled Effects
For simplicity of presentation, estimated effects are first presented for the five
program models described above.3 Table 3 presents pooled impacts on earnings, wel-58 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 2
Selected Baseline Characteristics of Sample Members by Program
Race and Ethnicity (%) Age Worked in
Program Sample Size White Black Hispanic (Years)past year (%)
SWIM (San Diego) 3,210 27.3 42.4 25.4 34.2 39.3
GAIN (California)
Alameda 1,205 17.9 70.0 7.5 34.7 19.8
Butte 1,229 86.3 3.5 5.6 33.6 100.0
Los Angeles 4,396 11.6 45.2 32.0 38.5 17.3
Riverside 5,508 51.7 15.6 27.4 33.7 39.5
San Diego 8,219 42.3 22.7 25.5 33.8 43.8
Tulare 2,234 52.1 3.6 39.0 34.9 42.1
NEWWS (Multi-state)
Atlanta LFA 3,825 3.8 94.7 0.9 32.7 38.6
Atlanta HCD 3,872 3.9 94.8 0.8 32.7 38.2
Grand Rapids LFA 3,010 48.8 40.3 8.1 28.1 49.3
Grand Rapids HCD 2,992 50.6 38.7 8.3 28.3 50.3
Riverside LFA 6,698 51.7 16.7 27.7 32.0 40.4
Riverside HCD 3,122 38.7 16.3 39.7 32.0 25.0
Columbus Integrated 4,651 46.5 51.9 0.5 31.9 54.1
Columbus Traditional 4,711 46.8 51.6 0.4 31.9 54.3
Detroit 4,392 11.0 87.3 0.8 30.0 33.2
Oklahoma City 6,867 59.6 29.1 4.3 28.1 56.0
Portland 5,455 69.6 20.1 4.1 30.3 42.1
MFIP (Minnesota)
Full Services 7,164 62.4 26.2 2.2 29.0 61.9
Incentives Only 5,537 58.1 30.3 2.2 29.9 59.9
WRP (Vermont)
Full Services 6,836 97.4 1.2 0.3 30.7 49.0
Incentives Only 3,396 97.6 1.1 0.3 30.8 49.0
Jobs First (Connecticut) 6,001 38.7 36.9 23.0 32.3 51.4
FTP (Florida)  2,721 45.4 51.8 1.1 29.2 46.7
fare payments, and income from earnings, welfare payments, and food stamp ben-
efits by race and ethnicity for the five program models described earlier.4 For all
three outcomes, results are averaged over the three years following random assign-
ment.
According to Table 3, most of the program models significantly raised earnings
and significantly reduced welfare payments for most subgroups. By contrast, only
the earning supplement programs consistently and significantly raised income across
the four racial and ethnic groups. This has been noted elsewhere, but is worth point-
ing out again: welfare policies that do not supplement earnings by, for example,
allowing welfare recipients to keep more of their welfare check when they work do
not generally increase income [Michalopoulos and Berlin, 2001; Bloom and
Michalopoulos, 2001]. Moreover, policies that increase income appear to benefit el-
ementary school-age children, while policies that do not increase income generally
do not benefit children [Morris et al., 2001; Clark-Kauffman et al., 2003; Huston et
al., 2001].559 WHAT WORKS BEST FOR WHOM?
TABLE 2 (cont.)
Selected Baseline Characteristics of Sample Members by Program
Children Welfare Status (%)
High School Long-term Short-term
credential (%) Number Age 5(%) recipients  recipients
SWIM (San Diego) 56.1 1.76 10.0 68.6 20.2
GAIN (California)
Alameda 63.2 1.95 30.6 100.0 0.0
Butte 57.9 1.72 0.0 45.4 23.2
Los Angeles 34.6 2.23 10.5 100.0 0.0
Riverside 52.6 1.92 16.4 48.3 35.9
San Diego 57.2 1.79 13.0 48.0 37.5
Tulare 45.2 2.04 14.8 66.9 33.1
NEWWS (Multi-state)
Atlanta LFA 62.1 2.08 42.9 66.0 34.0
Atlanta HCD 61.7 2.06 42.2 66.6 33.4
Grand Rapids LFA 58.6 1.78 68.3 59.5 40.5
Grand Rapids HCD 59.8 1.78 67.5 59.4 40.6
Riverside LFA 64.3 2.03 56.0 53.1 46.9
Riverside HCD 22.7 2.05 57.0 59.8 40.2
Columbus Integrated 58.2 2.01 47.4 73.0 17.3
Columbus Traditional 58.4 1.98 46.8 72.6 16.9
Detroit 57.5 1.99 64.6 76.5 23.5
Oklahoma City 56.2 1.74 64.6 24.4 32.0
Portland 66.8 1.97 68.3 63.1 36.9
MFIP (Minnesota)
Full Services 74.4 1.70 64.3 41.5 18.3
Incentives Only 73.8 1.72 64.9 46.0 18.2
WRP (Vermont)
Full Services 81.4 1.95 58.2 37.9 14.9
Incentives Only 82.1 1.97 58.7 37.3 15.2
Jobs First (Connecticut) 68.6 1.72 59.9 54.4 23.4
FTP (Florida)  61.8 1.94 68.8 52.8 35.0
Sample sizes correspond to the combined sample sizes for each program. Long-term recipients had been on
welfare for two or more years prior to random assignment, short-term recipients had been on welfare for
less than two years, and new applicants (the category not shown) had never been on welfare prior to ran-
dom assignment.
Table 3 does not show a clear story of one group being affected more than others.
For four of the program models, the programs affected earnings significantly differ-
ently across the four racial and ethnic groups, but which group had the largest and
which group the smallest earnings gains varies from approach to approach. Job-
search-first and education-first programs increased earnings more for Hispanic sample
members than white or African American, while employment-focused mixed-activ-
ity programs and earning supplement programs increased earnings the most for
white welfare recipients.
African-American welfare recipients may have benefited the least from this set
of programs. All approaches except for the earning supplement programs increased
earnings for African-American sample members, but impacts for them were never60 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 3
Impacts on Earnings, AFDC/TANF Payments, and Income by
Race and Ethnicity of Welfare and Work Experiments, by Program Model
Over Three Years Following Random Assignment
Impact on Average Impact on Average Impact on Average
Sample Total Earnings Total AFDC/TANF Total Income
Subgroup Size  per Year ($)  Payments per Year ($)  per Year ($)
Job search first †† ††† †††
White 5,957  318 (141) b 640 (66) a 520 (141) a
African-American 7,320  486 (113) a 293 (39) a 11 (106)
Hispanic 2,952  929 (182) a 750 (119) a 3 (192)
Other 514  949 (455) b 259 (257) 714 (471)
Education first †† ††
White 11,814  109 (76) 211 (30) a 153 (84) c
African-American16,014  295 (74) a 228 (26) a 17 (72)
Hispanic 1,894  559 (170) a 547 (112) a 211 (211)
Other 885 128 (252) 302 (118) b 562 (286)
Employment-focused mixed activities †
White 6,642 1,423 (138) a 756 (68) a 379 (140) a
African-American 1,961 708 (273) b 491 (138) a 63 (271)
Hispanic 1,736 1,085 (294) a 784 (214) a 206 (331)
Other 624 900 (531) c 792 (262) a 28 (525)
Education-focused mixed activities ††
White 6,432 695 (186) a 163 (116) 526 (191) a
African-American 4,820 360 (183) b 429 (115) a 206 (194)
Hispanic 4,532 157 (181) 235 (145) 98 (207)
Other 1,499 343 (147) b 356 (252) 10 (316)
Earnings supplements †† †††
White 21,211 219 (86) b 42 (37) 466 (78) a
African-American 7,296 209 (141) 216 (52) a 652 (141) a
Hispanic 1,731 36 (332) 296 (117) b 594 (327) c
Other 1,417 795 (309) b 554 (222) b 73 (291)
MDRC calculations from unemployment insurance (UI) earnings records, public assistance records, and
baseline demographics. Standard errors in parentheses. A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences be-
tween outcomes for the program and control groups. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: a = 1
percent; b = 5 percent; and c = 10 percent. An F-test was applied to differences among subgroups for each
characteristic. Statistical significance levels are indicated as † = 10 percent; †† = 5 percent; and ††† = 1
percent. For MFIP, AFDC/TANF includes General Asssitance and the cash value of food stamps.
Income includes earnings, TANF/AFDC payments, and the cash value of food stamps, with one exception.
Food stamps information was not collected in the evaluation of SWIM.
the largest. Even in this respect, the evidence is not very strong. Only for job-search-
first programs were impacts for African-American sample members statistically sig-
nificantly lower than for Hispanic sample members (p-value = 0.038 for a two-tailed61 WHAT WORKS BEST FOR WHOM?
test), and only for employment-focused mixed-activity programs were they signifi-
cantly lower than for white sample members (p-value = 0.019)
In all of the programs except those with earning supplements, welfare benefits
might have been reduced for several reasons. Recipients who went to work lost eligi-
bility for some or all of their welfare benefits. As a result, groups with larger earn-
ings gains would tend to be those with larger welfare savings. Mandates to partici-
pate in welfare-to-work services were enforced through partial family sanctions that
reduced (but never eliminated) welfare payments. If minority welfare recipients were
less able to respond to mandates, or if caseworkers were more likely to interpret
their actions as a failure to participate, impacts on welfare payments would be rela-
tively large for minority groups. Finally, welfare recipients might have decided to
leave the welfare system if the mandates constituted a hassle that they wanted to
avoid.
As a result of all three factors, the four programs that did not use earnings
supplements saved welfare dollars for all four racial and ethnic groups. There is
little evidence, however, that Hispanic or African-American recipients were dispro-
portionately affected by these reductions. In the two cases where welfare savings
were significantly different across the four groups, welfare savings were largest for
Hispanic sample members, but earning gains were also largest for Hispanic sample
members. In each case where welfare savings were significantly different for white
and African-American sample members (significance levels for this comparison are
not shown in the table), welfare reductions were larger for whites.
Earning supplement programs are in a different category when it comes to wel-
fare benefits because they allowed welfare recipients who went to work to keep more
of their welfare check when they worked. As a result, they generally increased wel-
fare payments. The exceptions include the time-limited welfare programs in Florida
and Connecticut, which did have enhanced welfare earnings disregards, but which
resulted in welfare savings when families had benefits terminated because of the
programs’ time limits.
In sum, the pooled results show little evidence that different racial groups ben-
efited more or less when it came to income gains. Earning supplement programs
increased income by about the same amount for each of the racial and ethnic groups.
The other programs generally had small and statistically insignificant effects. Where
significant differences across racial groups existed, job-search-first programs caused
statistically significant reductions in income for whites while education-focused mixed
activity programs caused statistically significant income gains for whites.
Impacts for Individual Programs
Although pooling impacts by program model is convenient for purposes of pre-
sentation and is appropriate if impacts are similar across programs of the same type,
it is reasonable to ask how consistent programs are within the five program models.
In addition, because some sites are primarily white, others are primarily African-
American, and most Hispanic sample members were in California sites, differences62 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
FIGURE 1
Comparison of Impacts on Annual Earnings over Three Years
in Welfare and Work Experiments by Race and Ethnicity
Notes: Large diamonds indicate differences that were statistically significant at the 10
percent level using a two-tailed test.
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in pooled impact across racial and ethnic groups might reflect differences in impacts
of individual programs.
Figure 1 compares each program’s effects on earnings over the three-year follow-
up period by race and ethnicity.6 The top figure compares impacts on earnings for
white sample members (the horizontal axis) to impacts for African-American sample
members (the vertical axis). The middle figure contains a similar comparison of im-
pacts on earnings for Hispanic and white sample members, and the bottom figure
compares impacts for Hispanic and African-American sample members. The figures
show results only for programs with 200 or more sample members in each racial or
ethnic group to eliminate cases with very imprecise estimates. On each figure, large
diamonds represent programs where differences across the two groups were statisti-
cally significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. Finally, each figure
includes a 45-degree line to show programs that had the same effect for both groups.
In the top figure, for example, points to the left and above the 45-degree line show
programs with larger earnings gains for African-Americans than for whites.
Figure 1 reveals little systematic difference in the impacts of the programs on
earnings for the three racial and ethnic groups. Of the 18 programs shown in the top
figure, for example, 11 had larger effects on earnings of white sample members.7 In
addition, differences in impacts between white and African-American sample mem-
bers were statistically significant in only four cases in Figure 1. In two of those cases
(Grand Rapids LFA and Full MFIP), African-Americans had larger earnings gains
than whites, while in the other two cases (Portland and Jobs First), African-Ameri-
cans had smaller earnings gains.
Figure 2 shows a similar comparison of impacts on welfare benefits and Figure 3
compares impacts on income, both measured over three years. In both cases, there is
little evidence that programs systematically had different results by racial or ethnic
group. In no case are there significant differences between groups in more than two
programs, and the impacts are about as likely to favor white sample members as
African-American or Hispanic sample members.
In contrast to the similarity of impacts across racial and ethnic groups presented
here, Chernick and Reimers [2003] found substantial differences in behavior over
time in New York City. Comparing employment and use of public assistance before
and after the 1996 welfare reform, Chernick and Reimers found the largest changes
among Hispanic residents—particularly Puerto Ricans—and little change among
African-American residents.
Chernick and Reimers also found substantial differences in demographics across
their racial and ethnic groups. Perhaps differences in demographics across the pro-
grams studied in this paper mask underlying differences in the effectiveness of the
programs. To explore this possibility, the effects of the programs were adjusted for
differences in other characteristics by estimating a regression that included an indi-
cator of whether someone was in a program or control group, a vector of characteris-
tics, and interactions between the characteristics and the program group indicator.
Including the interaction of other characteristics with the program group indicator
yields estimates of the effects of the programs by race and ethnicity, holding other
characteristics constant. Those characteristics included welfare status at random
assignment (long-term recipients of two or more years, short-term recipients, or ap-64 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
FIGURE 2
Comparison of Impacts on Annual Welfare Payments over Three Years
in Welfare and Work Experiments by Race and Ethnicity
Notes: Large diamonds indicate differences that were statistically significant at the 10
percent level using a two-tailed test.
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FIGURE 3
Comparison of Impacts on Annual Income over Three Years
in Welfare and Work Experiments by Race and Ethnicity































































































Notes: Large diamonds indicate differences that were statistically significant at the 10
percent level using a two-tailed test.66 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
FIGURE 4
Comparison of Impacts on Annual Earnings over Three Years
Controlling for Other Demographic Characteristics




























































































Notes: Large diamonds indicate differences that were statistically significant at the 10
percent level using a two-tailed test.67 WHAT WORKS BEST FOR WHOM?
plicant), age of youngest child at random assignment (under 3 years old, 3-5 years
old, 6-12 years old, 13-18 years old), earnings in the year prior to random assignment
(0, less than $5,000, and more than $5,000), number of children (1, 2, 3 or more), sex
(male or female), and whether the person had a high school diploma or GED at the
time of random assignment.
Figure 4 compares the impacts on annual earnings over three years implied by
the regression. As with the unadjusted results shown in Figure 1, there is little
systematic variation across racial and ethnic groups. Many of the impacts are clus-
tered near the 45-degree line, few of the differences are statistically significant, and
impacts are about as likely to be larger for one group as for another.
Explaining Differences in Impacts Across Programs
Figures 1 through 3 do not show any systematic differences in individual pro-
grams or across program models. The figures do not, however, give a precise sense of
those differences, nor do they account for differences in intensity of the programs or
the environments in which they were implemented. This section presents results
from a meta-analytic regression in which the left-hand-side variable is the estimated
impact by program and subgroup and the right-hand-side variables include the ef-
fect of the programs on job search and education, the generosity of the welfare sys-
tem and financial work incentives, the presence of time limits, and the state of the
local economy.
The variances of estimates from a meta-analytic regression are smallest when
an observation (in this case, the estimated effect of a program for a subgroup) re-
ceives a weight inversely proportional to its variance [Hedges and Olkin, 1985]. More
precisely estimated impacts are weighted more heavily because they are likely to be
closer to the true, population impacts. This choice of weights does not affect the
consistency of the point estimates of the coefficients—they are consistent whether
each observation receives an equal weight or whether they are weighted by the in-
verse of their variances—and the weighting scheme can also be thought of as a cor-
rection for heteroskedasticity.
A number of factors are examined in the meta-analytical regressions.
Program Participation. Welfare-to-work services can be effective only if people
use them. To explore the relationship between the use of services and program im-
pacts, impacts on job search activities, and the use of education and training are
included in the analysis. Because the GAIN evaluation did not estimate the impact
of the Butte program on participation in job search or education, Butte is not in-
cluded in the meta-analysis. Because estimates of participation by race and ethnicity
were not calculated for most programs, the analysis uses the impact on job search
and education for the entire sample in a study.
Financial Work Incentives. Financial work incentives are expected to increase
a program’s effects on employment and income, but their expected effect on earnings68 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
is unclear because of offsetting income and substitution effects. Each program’s fi-
nancial work incentive was calculated as the difference in income from earnings,
welfare payments, and food stamps between the old and new program rules for part-
time work of 20 hours per week and for full-time work of 40 hours per week. In both
cases, it was assumed that the parent had two children, had no other sources of
income, and earned $6 per hour. By this measure, monthly part-time work incen-
tives in the earning supplement programs ranged from $67 in WRP to $345 per
month in Jobs First. Full-time work incentives ranged from $0 in WRP and FTP to
$657 in Jobs First.
Time Limits on Welfare Receipt. Time limits are expected to reduce income
and welfare payments relative to what they would have been, and might encourage
employment and increase earnings. To capture the effects of time limits, the regres-
sions include a variable that equals one for the time-limited welfare programs in
Florida and Connecticut. Both time-limited programs included financial work incen-
tives as well, but participants could receive them only until they hit the program’s
time limit. In Florida, work incentives were multiplied by 2/3 because many recipi-
ents were eligible for welfare benefits for only 24 months in the 36-month follow-up
period. In Connecticut, full-time work incentives were multiplied by 21/36 since fami-
lies would have lost eligibility for welfare after 21 months if the parent had been
working full time. Because most parents working part time in Connecticut received
extension to the time limit, the part-time incentive was not adjusted.
The Economy. To explore the effects of local economic conditions, the regres-
sions include the local unemployment rate when the study began. It is not clear how
program impacts would be affected by these conditions. Weak economic conditions
imply that few people will be able to find work and that jobs will pay little. At the
same time, a weak economy will result in a less disadvantaged caseload if it brings
people onto the rolls who will leave welfare quickly. Both factors are true for both the
control and program groups, however, and impacts may therefore be either higher
or lower when the economy is in bad shape.
Welfare Grant Levels. Welfare grant levels might alter a program’s effective-
ness by changing who enters the caseload and the incentives to leave welfare for
work. The welfare guarantee in Riverside was close to $700 per month for a single
mother with two children, among the highest levels in the country, but was about
$300 per month in Atlanta. This suggests that a person receiving welfare in Atlanta
would have few other prospects for economic support, and that sample members in
Atlanta are likely to be more disadvantaged than sample members in Riverside. At
the same time, all else equal, sample members in low-grant states like Georgia are
likely to stay on welfare for a shorter period because benefits are so low. In low-grant
states, almost any job will pay enough to make a person ineligible for welfare ben-
efits; in a high-grant state, it is easier to combine work and welfare. This suggests
that programs will have a harder time reducing welfare use and, presumably, in-
creasing employment and earnings in low-grant states than in high-grant states.69 WHAT WORKS BEST FOR WHOM?
Results. Table 4 shows the implied determinants of impacts on earnings. Since
a central question of the paper is whether impacts differ by racial and ethnic groups,
the last two rows contains the results of chi-square tests for whether the estimated
parameters differ between racial and ethnic groups.
Most of the factors examined are significantly related to how much a program
affected the earnings of white sample members. A program that wants to increase
earnings for white welfare recipients should increase the amount of job search that
is done, reduce part-time work incentives, and impose a time limit. Moreover, the
impacts are likely to be larger in states with larger welfare grants and a location
TABLE 4
Estimated Determinants of Impacts of Welfare and Work Policies on
Annual Earnings Over Three Years, by Race and Ethnicity
African    
White American Hispanic   Other
Welfare-to-work participation
Impact on Job Search 21.9 a 10.8 b 17.2 c 29.8 c
(4.7) (5.1) (8.9) (17.9)
Impact on Education 1.9 4.9 4.8 8.8
(5.6) (5.6) (7.8) (15.7)
Financial work incentives
Part-time 3.39 b 0.50 4.74 6.80
  (20 hours/week) (1.35) (1.60) (5.90) (5.23)
Full-time 0.07 2.15 2.66 3.71
  (40 hours/ week) (1.45) (1.63) (6.07) (7.29)
Time limit 842 a 141 449 992
(284) (258) (1527) (984)
Economic factors
Welfare grant level 1.54 a 0.03 0.18 0.77
for a family of 3 (0.42) (0.47) (0.98) (1.20)
Unemployment rate 84.3 a 24.1 47.7 93.7
(27.4) (32.3) (31.5) (70.9)
Intercept 172 261 c 297 53
(128) (158) (349) (587)
Chi-square test of difference with white 22.5 a 14.7 c 9.9
p-value 0.004 0.066 0.276
Chi-square test of difference with African    American 8.3 6.2
p-value 0.402 0.622
                    
Estimates are the result of a fixed-effects regression using subgroup impacts. Statistical significance levels
are indicated as: a = 1 percent; b = 5 percent; and c = 10 percent. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Impacts on participation in job search and education activities were estimated on the full sample, not by
racial and ethnic group. The part-time work incentive is estimated as the difference in income from earn-
ings, cash assistance payments, and food stamps between the new and old programs for a parent with two
children who works 20 hours per week and earns $6 per hour. The full-time work incentive is defined in a
similar way if the parent works 40 hours per week.70 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
with a stronger economy (as represented by a lower unemployment rate). The only
factors that were not significantly related to impacts on earnings were the program’s
effect on enrollment in education, and full-time work incentives.8
In contrast to the effects of welfare-to-work programs on white welfare recipi-
ents, the second column of Table 4 implies that little is related to gains in earnings
among African-American sample members except for job search. A one percentage
point increase in the likelihood that an African-American welfare recipient partici-
pates in job search is associated with a $10.80 increase in annual earnings. The
estimated effects of all other factors are close to zero. Moreover, the effects of the
various factors are significantly different for white and African-American welfare
recipients.
In addition to job search, the intercept was also statistically significant for Afri-
can-American welfare recipients, implying that a welfare-to-work program that did
not change job search or education, that had no financial work incentives, and that
did not impose a time limit on welfare receipt would still increase earnings by $261
per year. This might imply that the meta-analysis has excluded factors that affect a
program’s impact on earnings. It is also possible that a program that did not affect
job search over several years might have increased job search initially and resulted
in more earnings over the three-year period. Finally, simply requiring welfare re-
cipients to participate in activities might encourage some of them to work without
participating in formal job search activities.
As for African-American welfare recipients, only job search was found to signifi-
cantly increase earnings among Hispanic welfare recipients. The difference between
whites and Hispanics, however, are generally small, implying that the insignificant
determinants for Hispanic sample members might reflect the relatively small num-
ber of Hispanic sample members in the programs. Differences between African-Ameri-
can and Hispanic sample members were not statistically significant.
Table 5 shows the implied determinants of impacts on welfare payments over
the three years following random assignment. By and large, the results are similar
but opposite in direction from those in Table 4, reflecting the fact that increased
earnings resulted in lower welfare payments in all programs. Part-time work incen-
tives are associated with an especially large increase in welfare payments because
they took the form of enhanced earnings disregards that allowed welfare recipients
to remain on the rolls with higher earnings than under AFDC.
Table 6 shows the implied determinants of impacts on income from earnings,
welfare, and the cash value of food stamps over the three years following random
assignment. Only one policy factor consistently affected income: financial work in-
centives. An extra dollar of full-time work incentives is associated with an increase
in annual income of $2.36 for white welfare recipients, while an extra dollar of part-
time work incentives is associated with an increase in income ranging from $2.47 for
white welfare recipients to $6.90 for African-American welfare recipients.
Unlike virtually all the other effects examined in this section, the effects of time
limits appear to fall disproportionately on nonwhite welfare recipients. For whites,
time limits are associated with neither an increase nor a decrease in income, but
they are associated with decreases for other groups ranging from $508 for African-
Americans to $675 for Hispanics and $1,540 for others (although the last two esti-
mates are not significantly different from zero). It is important to remember that71 WHAT WORKS BEST FOR WHOM?
TABLE 5
Estimated Determinants of Impacts of Welfare and Work Policies on
Annual Earnings from AFCD or TANF over Three Years,
by Race and Ethnicity
African-
White American Hispanic   Other
Welfare-to-work participation
Impact on Job Search13.2 a 4.9 b 9.1 14.0
(2.8) (2.3) (6.5) (10.4)
Impact on Education 4.6 0.9 4.4 6.3
(3.1) (2.5) (5.5) (10.6)
Financial work incentives
Part-time 7.85 a 6.55 a 7.79 b 8.29 a
  (20 hours/ week) (1.15) (0.77) (3.09) (2.82)
Full-time 0.33 0.00 1.49 2.75
  (40 hours/ week) (0.48) (0.52) (1.61) (2.53)
Time limit 598 a 432 a 164 228
(130) (93) (375) (477)
Economic factors
Welfare grant level 1.25 a 1.00 a 0.03 0.49
  for a family of 3 (0.25) (0.20) (0.59) (0.80)
Unemployment rate 31.9 b 31.7 c 29.2 43.1
(15.7) (17.3) (23.8) (52.9)
Intercept 394 a 308 a 435 c 64
(83) (72) (240) (383)
Chi-square test of difference with white 29.8 12.9 7.6
p-value <0.001 0.116 0.478
Chi-square test of difference with African-American 55.3a 42.9 a
p-value <0.001 <0.001  
                
Estimates are the result of a fixed-effects regression using subgroup impacts. Statistical significance levels
are indicated as: a = 1 percent; b = 5 percent; and c = 10 percent. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Impacts on participation in job search and education activities were estimated on the full sample, not by
racial and ethnic group. The part-time work incentive is estimated as the difference in income from earn-
ings, cash assistance payments, and Food Stamps between the new and old programs for a parent with two
children who works 20 hours per week and earns $6 per hour. The full-time work incentive is defined in a
similar way if the parent works 40 hours per week. For MFIP, welfare payments included General Assis-
tance and the cash value of Food Stamps.
both programs with time limits also had financial work incentives. The estimated
effect of the time limit is for a hypothetical program with no other policies. In fact,
the overall effects of the Connecticut and Florida programs on income over the three
years following random assignment were not significantly different by race.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper examined the effects of twenty-four experimental welfare and work
policies on earnings, welfare benefits, and income for white, African-American, and72 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Hispanic welfare recipients. In general, the programs do not appear to have system-
atically favored one group over another. Programs with large effects overall gener-
ally had large effects across the three groups, while programs with small overall
effects generally had small effects across the three groups.
Among five program models examined, one approach had the largest impacts on
earnings (and welfare benefits) for white, African-American, and Hispanic welfare
recipients. This approach stressed the importance of employment to all welfare re-
cipients, but allowed less job-ready parents to enroll in education and training before
looking for work. The result suggests that the programs developed by many states
TABLE 6
Estimated Determinants of Impacts of Welfare and Work Policies on
Annual Income over Three Years, by Race and Ethnicity
African-
White American  Hispanic  Other
Welfare-to-work participation
Impact on Job Search 3.7 5.6 6.4 32.2
(4.5) (5.0) (9.6) (20.1)
Impact on Education 7.5 1.3 0.6 6.1
(5.7) (5.4) (8.6) (18.8)
Financial work incentives
Part-time 2.47 c 6.90 a 4.05 5.95
(20 hours/week) (1.28) (1.58) (5.65) (4.92)
Full-time 2.36 c 0.55 1.07 5.17
(40 hours/week) (1.40) (1.56) (6.13) (6.44)
Time limit 256 508 b 675 1540
(282) (256) (1545) (1064)
Economic factors
Welfare grant level 0.68 1.12 b 0.31 0.91
for a family of 3 (0.43) (0.45) (1.15) (1.44)
Unemployment rate 75.6 a 6.5 15.2 67.3
(29.0) (33.4) (35.5) (86.4)
Intercept 194 210 165 497
(121) (155) (377) (694)
Chi-square test of difference with white 20.2 a 8.0 15.6 b
p-value 0.010 0.434 0.049
Chi-square test of difference with African    American 9.2 18.3 b
p-value 0.323 0.019
                  
Estimates are the result of a fixed-effects regression using subgroup impacts. Statistical significance levels
are indicated as: a = 1 percent; b = 5 percent; and c = 10 percent. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Impacts on participation in job search and education activities were estimated on the full sample, not by
racial and ethnic group. The part-time work incentive is estimated as the difference in income from earn-
ings, cash assistance payments, and Food Stamps between the new and old programs for a parent with two
children who works 20 hours per week and earns $6 per hour. The full-time work incentive is defined in a
similar way if the parent works 40 hours per week. Income includes earnings, AFDC and TANF payments,
and the cash value of food stamps. For MFIP, income also includes General Assistance. For SWIM, income
does not include food stamps.73 WHAT WORKS BEST FOR WHOM?
requiring all welfare recipients to look for work before anything else are well-inten-
tioned but probably too extreme in their use of job search.
Among the five program models examined, programs that required nearly all
welfare recipients to enroll in education or training affected earnings for white and
African-American welfare recipients the least. Programs that used a mix of initial
activities but, unlike the most successful programs, were education-focused rather
than employment-focused, had the smallest effect on earnings of Hispanic welfare
recipients. This result suggests that it might be inappropriate to stress education too
much.
The small effects of education-focused programs do not necessarily suggest that
education and training are inappropriate for welfare recipients. The education-first
programs studied in this paper were typical programs, and more exemplary educa-
tion or training programs might have had larger effects on employment and earn-
ings. Moreover, most of them focused on basic education, and little was learned about
the effects of other types of human capital development such as vocational educa-
tion. Many of the participants in the education-first programs dropped out of the
programs before completing them, so it is not surprising that their effects were small.
Many participants said they preferred to work rather than sit in a classroom, adding
more credibility to the greater effects of the programs that allowed education but
stressed employment. Voluntary training programs, moreover, have been found to
substantially increase earnings among low-skilled women [Greenberg et al., 2003].
Finally, the larger effects of employment-focused programs with a mix of activities
imply that education can play an important role when well targeted.
The only group of programs to consistently increase income supplemented the
earnings of welfare recipients who went to work. This suggests that the more gener-
ous earnings disregards put into place by the vast majority of states under TANF—
not to mention the federal Earned Income Credit—might reduce poverty as well.
Most earnings disregards, however, provide greater incentives for part-time work
than full-time work, and the results in this paper suggest that part-time financial
incentives do not increase earnings, so that the increased income coming from disre-
gards primarily reflects increased welfare benefits. Individuals who combine work
and welfare are using up months of assistance that they may need later if they lose
a job or other source of income. State policymakers might reconsider whether wel-
fare recipients who “play by the rules” (that is, work) should be subject to the same
time-limit policies as those who do not work. One option would be to “stop the clock”
for families who combine welfare and work. To pay for these benefits—which would
be smaller than regular welfare payments—states could use TANF maintenance-of-74 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
effort funds, which means the assistance would not count toward federal time limits
on benefits. Research in several states suggests that providing financial incentives
to welfare recipients who go to work can increase employment, reduce poverty, and
improve family and child outcomes.
APPENDIX
DESCRIPTION OF THE RANDOM ASSIGNMENT STUDIES
This appendix contains a brief description of each of the studies that contributed
data to the analyses presented in the paper.
The Saturation Work Initiative Model (SWIM). Operated between July 1985
and September 1987, SWIM was an employment-focused program that was manda-
tory for most single-parent AFDC households with no child under age 6 [Hamilton
and Friedlander, 1989]. SWIM started most participants off with a two-week job
search workshop. Participants who did not find a job after job search were referred
to the Employment Work Experience Program (EWEP), which required them to work
20 to 30 hours per week for 13 weeks in public or nonprofit agencies in exchange for
their welfare benefits. Those who were still not working after EWEP were referred
to community education and training programs.
Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN). Implemented in the mid-1980s,
GAIN was California’s welfare-to-work program. In six of the state’s 58 counties, the
effects of GAIN were studied using a random assignment evaluation begun in early
1988 [Riccio et al., 1994]. Participants in the welfare-to-work program were placed in
one of two tracks after an initial assessment. Individuals who had neither a high
school diploma nor a General Educational Development (GED) certificate, who ob-
tained low scores on either a basic reading or math test, or who were not proficient in
English were considered “in need of basic education.” Most entered a program of
basic education, GED preparation, or English as a Second Language (ESL). Most
other participants were required to enroll in a supervised job search activity. If a
participant in either track completed her first activity without finding a job, she may
have been referred to on-the-job training, work experience, supported work, or other
education and training. Although the six GAIN counties studied shared a uniform
program model, the characteristics of the counties and their implementation of the
model differed somewhat. In particular, the program operated in Riverside was much
more employment focused than the others. Nearly all staff in Riverside emphasized
quick employment, while no more than half in any other county did so.
The National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS).
NEWWS studied 11 welfare-to-work programs created or adapted to fit the provi-
sions of the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program of the Fam-
ily Support Act of 1988. For more information on the Family Support Act and the
JOBS program, see Hamilton and Brock [1994], Chapter 1. JOBS was designed to
help states reach the hard-to-serve by requiring states to spend at least 55 percent of
JOBS resources on potential long-term recipients, including those who had received75 WHAT WORKS BEST FOR WHOM?
welfare in 36 of the prior 60 months, those who were custodial parents under age 24
without a high school diploma or GED, those who had little work experience, and
those who were about to lose eligibility for welfare because their youngest child was
age 16 or over.
NEWWS studied policies in seven sites: Atlanta, Georgia; Columbus, Ohio; De-
troit and Grand Rapids, Michigan; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Portland, Oregon;
and Riverside, California [Freedman et al., 2000]. Three sites — Atlanta, Grand
Rapids, and Riverside — implemented both “labor force attachment” (LFA) programs
that required most participants to begin with job search activities and “human capi-
tal development” (HCD) programs that required most participants to begin with ba-
sic education. In Atlanta and Grand Rapids, people were randomly assigned to the
control group, the HCD program group, or the LFA program group. In Riverside,
those in need of basic education according to the GAIN criteria described above were
randomly assigned to one of these three groups, but those not in need of basic educa-
tion were randomly assigned to either the control group or the LFA program group.
Two programs in Columbus required participants to enroll in education or training,
but tested different forms of case management. In particular, people in Columbus
were randomly assigned to the control group, a traditional case management group
in which one caseworker verified eligibility for welfare and a second managed pro-
gram participation, or an integrated case management group in which one case-
worker both verified eligibility and managed program participation. Programs in
Detroit and Oklahoma City likewise assigned most participants initially to educa-
tion or training, although both sites made greater use of long-term education and
training than the other education-focused programs studied in NEWWS. The elev-
enth program — in Portland — emphasized to clients that the goal of the program
was to get a job but encouraged participants to wait until they found a “good” job and
encouraged those in need of more skills to enroll in education or training initially
and look for a job later.
The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP). The pilot MFIP study
was begun in 1994 to test whether financial incentives would encourage welfare
recipients to work [Miller et al., 2000]. MFIP allowed working welfare recipients to
continue receiving benefits until they earned 140 percent of the federal poverty thresh-
old. Put another way, a mother of two who worked 20 hours per week and earned $6
per hour would receive almost $250 more in income under MFIP than under AFDC.
In addition, MFIP required welfare recipients to participate in its welfare-to-work
program after they had received welfare in 24 months over a three-year period.
MFIP’s welfare-to-work program was an employment-focused program that assigned
more job-ready individuals to jobs search but allowed others to enroll initially in
education programs. This paper describes results for two versions of MFIP, an in-
centives-only program that offered program group members the enhanced earnings
disregard, and a full-services program that not only offered the enhanced disregard
but also required long-term recipients to participate in the welfare-to-work program.
MFIP is also the name of Minnesota’s TANF program, which is a modified version of
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The Family Transition Program (FTP). Florida’s Family Transition Program
(FTP) was a pilot version of a time-limited welfare program studied in Escambia
County (Pensacola) beginning in 1994 [Bloom et al., 2000]. FTP required partici-
pants to engage in employment and training services, included a financial incentive
that made work pay more than it did under AFDC rules, and imposed a time limit on
receipt of welfare benefits. About 40 percent of the program group was considered
more disadvantaged and allowed to receive welfare for 36 months in a 72-month
period before reaching the program’s time limit because they had received welfare
for at least 36 of the 60 months prior to random assignment or because the parent
was a high school dropout under age 24 with little or no recent work history. The
remaining 60 percent of the program group was allowed to receive welfare for 24
months in a 60-month period before reaching the time limit. Unlike the other pro-
grams in this paper, the control group in FTP was also required to participate in
services through Project Independence, Florida’s JOBS program. Although both the
control and program groups were required to participate in employment and train-
ing services, the mandate was different for the two groups in several ways. First, the
welfare-to-work program for the control group was not fully funded during the pe-
riod when FTP was studied. Second, control group members with a child under age
3 were exempt from the participation mandate. Third, mandates were much more
strictly enforced for the program group than for the control group. Fourth, more
participants in the program group were allowed to participate in education and skills
development because they were not considered job ready.
Connecticut Jobs First. Jobs First began operating in January 1996 as
Connecticut’s TANF program [Bloom et al., 2002]. With a 21-month time limit, Jobs
First had the shortest time limit in the country. In practice, however, most families
that reached the time limit while the program was being evaluated were granted an
extension if they had earnings that were less than their welfare grant plus $90. In
addition to the time limit, the program required welfare recipients to enroll in em-
ployment and training services that included both job search and basic education.
Welfare recipients were also encouraged to work through the program’s generous
financial incentive, which allowed them to keep their entire welfare check and food
stamp benefit as long as they were earning less than the federal poverty threshold.
The Vermont Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP). One of the earliest state-
wide welfare reform programs initiated under waivers of federal welfare rules prior
to 1996, WRP used a number of policies to try to increase self-sufficiency by enabling
families to supplement or supplant public assistance with earnings [Scrivener et al.,
2002]. To provide a financial incentive to work, WRP had an earned income disre-
gard that allowed parents to keep more earnings than under ANFC after an initial
period of work. To ease the transition away from welfare, WRP extended Medicaid
and child care subsidies longer than under ANFC. To allow parents a means of find-77 WHAT WORKS BEST FOR WHOM?
ing and keeping a job, WRP permitted welfare recipients to own a more valuable car
than under ANFC. Finally, to force parents to work if all other encouragement failed,
WRP included a time limit that required parents to work after 30 months.
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MacArthur Foundation through the Next Generation project at MDRC. The paper benefited from
Robert Plotnick’s comments on a version presented at the Eastern Economic Association annual con-
ference in New York in February 2003, as well as comments from Judy Gueron, Gordon Berlin, Howard
Bloom, and Virginia Knox at MDRC; and Alan Yaffe at the Administration for Children and Families
at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Finally, I am indebted to Bryan Ricchetti for
his programming help and generally superb research assistance.
1. In addition, two similar programs studied since 1990 by MDRC— Florida’s Project Independence and
Los Angeles’ Jobs First GAIN — were not included in the paper because they did not have three years
of data following random assignment.
2. Although the UI system excludes earnings from some jobs, most of the evaluations of the programs in
this paper also used surveys to measure earnings and differences between the two data sources are
generally small. Moreover, Kornfeld and Bloom [1999] found that the impacts on earnings using UI
records and surveys were not significantly different from one another in the national JTPA study. The
income measure also does not include the federal Earned Income Credit (EIC), which provides a family
with as much as about $4,000 per year. Once again, most of the evaluations also estimated the effects
of the EIC net of income and payroll taxes and generally found that conclusions regarding income were
unchanged. Programs that did not significantly raise income in general did not significantly raise
income after the EIC and taxes were taken into account. As explained in Appendix D of Bloom and
Michalopoulos [2001], many parents earned less than needed to received the maximum EIC, many
earned so much that they were beyond the maximum EIC they could receive, and many had only one
child so that they were eligible for less than the $4,000 maximum. In the Connecticut Jobs First pro-
gram, in fact, income after accounting for the EIC and taxes was lower than before because so many
families earned enough to be on the phase-out region of the EIC or to be eligible for no credit at all.
3. To calculate the pooled effects by program model, effects were estimated first for each program and
each subgroup as the difference between the average outcome for program and control group members
in the program-subgroup combination. Pooled effects are the weighted average of effects by program,
with weights for a subgroup-program estimate proportional to the inverse of the square of the stan-
dard error of the estimate. This weighting scheme provides the minimum variance average estimate
within each program model [Hedges and Olkin, 1985, Chapter 8]. An alternative to this weighting
scheme is to weight estimates from each program equally. This has the advantage of giving estimates
from each program equal importance, regardless of the racial composition of the site. However, the
resulting pooled estimates are less precise. To give one example, the average effect of the job-search-
first programs on white sample members is estimated to be $318 per year with a standard error of 141
when the weighting scheme described in the text is used, but it has an estimated average effect of $455
per year with a standard error of 274 when the sites are weighted equally. The reduced precision from
equal weighting would provide a more conservative estimate of differences by race or across program
models than the pooled results presented in this paper.
4. Impacts on stable employment and stable welfare exits were also calculated but are not shown here. In
both cases, impacts were not systematically different across racial and ethnic groups.
5. The income measure does not include the federal Earned Income Credit (EIC), which provides a family
with as much as about $4,000 per year. Most of the evaluations also estimated the effects of the EIC net
of income and payroll taxes and generally found that conclusions regarding income were unchanged.
As explained in Appendix D of Bloom and Michalopoulos [2001], many parents earned less than needed
to received the maximum EIC, many earned so much that they were beyond the maximum EIC they78 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
could receive, and many had only one child so that they were eligible for less than the $4,000 maxi-
mum.
6. An appendix of results for each program is available from the author.
7. If the programs were in reality equally likely to have larger effects for whites than for African-Ameri-
can sample members, there would be an 11.9 percent chance of seeing 11 or more differences in favor
of one group.
8. The impact of education and training on earnings might be larger in a later period since welfare recipi-
ents probably had to forego work and earnings to take part in education or training. A regression of
impacts in the third year after random assignment, however, found a larger but still statistically insig-
nificant relationship between a program’s impact on education and training activities and its impact
on earnings.
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